Manufacturers' Liability for Drugs and Medical
Devices Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability '
The Hon. William A. Dreier*
The question of liability for prescription drugs has engendered a
three-way debate among: (1) the proponents of a pure negligence or
risk-utility standard; (2) those who agree with the new formulations of
section 6 of the 1966 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability (the Restatement (Third)); and (3) the adherents of section
402A, comment k, of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In a 1994
law review article, Professor Richard L. Cupp comprehensively
explained the middle-of-the-road negligence approach.'
The
Restatement (Third) approach, however, amended slightly to address
unusual cases, strikes the proper balance between a plaintiffs
interests and the interests of drug or medical device manufacturers. I
agree with Professor Cupp and the Restatement (Third) Reporters
that either approach is preferable to the incomprehensible old
comment k, which proclaimed both liability
and exoneration under
2
the rubric of an unavoidable lack of safety.
The Restatement (Third) section 6, excluding subsection (e)
(concerning retail sellers) states:
(a) A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device who
sells or otherwise distributes a defective drug or medical device is
subject to liability for harm to persons caused by the defect. A
prescription drug or medical device is one that may be legally sold
or otherwise distributed only pursuant to a health-care provider's
prescription.
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(b) For purposes of liability under Subsection (a), a prescription
drug or medical device is defective if at the time of sale or other
distribution the drug or medical device:
(1) contains a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a); or
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design as defined
in Subsection (c); or
(3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or
warnings as defined in Subsection (d).
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe
due to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its
foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care
providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic
benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any
class of patients.
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe
due to inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are
not provided to:
(1) prescribing and other health-care providers who are in a
position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the
instructions or warning; or
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason
to know that health-care providers will not be in a position
to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the
instructions or warnings. 3
Subsection (a), which assesses liability for a defective drug or
medical device and defines the terms "prescription drug or medical
device," while leaving the definition of "defect" to succeeding
subsections, raises no real issues. Subsection (b) classifies possible
defects according to the same three-part categories of section 2 of the
Restatement (Third), which governs products liability generally.
Commenters have not challenged subsection 2(b)(1), seemingly
because they appear to agree that a manufacturing defect in this
context, as with manufacturing liability in any other context, warrants
accountability.
The hue and cry of the plaintiffs' bar, however, centers on
subsection (c), while the defendants' bar bemoans subsection (d).
Plaintiffs chastise the Reporters for absolving drug manufacturers
from design defect liability if a reasonable health-care provider,
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knowing the foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would4
"prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients.
Thus, plaintiffs argue, manufacturers have a license to loose upon the
world highly dangerous drugs that have but one obscure palliative
purpose.
This argument fails for three reasons. First, subsection (c) does
not give manufacturers carte blanche. Instead, liability is subject to a
threshold, albeit weak, risk-utility balancing analysis.5 Nonefficacious
drugs violate this provision, as do drugs whose meager benefits are far
outweighed by significant risks. Next, the standard of judgment is
not that of an untutored user, but rather that of a learned6
intermediary, a "reasonable [prescribing] health-care provider."
Third, and most importantly, subsection (c) must be read in
conjunction with subsection (d) in order to understand the full scope
of liability. The assertion of the limited design defect risk-utility test
is merely a precursor to the basic liability of section 6(d) for failure to
provide adequate instructions or warnings.
A prescription drug or medical device manufacturer does not
Although mass
distribute its products directly to the public.
advertising may create public demand, the prescription process
controls supply. In the limited situations in which a patient or a
nonprescriber maintains some control over distribution, such as
when extended renewals are permitted, or in the case of mass
vaccinations, section 6(d)(2) of the Restatement (Third) provides a
basis for liability for failure to warn the patient directly. As noted
later, the Reporters abandoned broader liability for advertising to
potential patients without adequate warnings.
Generally speaking, however, the distribution scheme depends
on the existence of a health-care professional who will scan the field
of drugs or devices and choose the appropriate product. Thus, the
fact that Thalidomide might provide relief for leprosy, but may cause
birth defects, does not necessarily mean that the drug manufacturer
defectively designed the drug. Under the risk-utility test of section 6
of the Restatement (Third), this drug is not defectively designed
because it has a recognized and substantial beneficial use, even
though extensive warnings are required to alert pregnant users of its
disastrous side effects. A manufacturer, however, cannot prevent
Id. § 6(c).'
See id. ("[T]he risks of harm posed by the drug .. . are sufficiently great in
relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits" so that it would not be prescribed
"for any class of patients.").
4
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Instead, the
negligent prescription through a drug's design.
manufacturer must adequately warn the prescribing health-care
provider, thereby relegating the injured user to a warning defect or
malpractice claim.
A harder case might be one in which the manufacturer has
produced an efficacious drug that could have been made less risky.
For example, years ago I sat on a case involving diphtheria, pertussis,
and tetanus (DPT) vaccines One allegation concerned the various
processes available to create the vaccine. The plaintiffs claimed that
technology existed, the use of which would both produce a vaccine
containing fewer toxins and greatly reduce the risk to recipients of
the vaccine." This technology, however, cost more to employ than
the technology actually used to produce the subject DPT vaccine.
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the case by
excluding vaccines from the rules that generally apply to drugs and
other products, the questions raised in the appellate division opinion
remain. Should a manufacturer be absolved of liability for producing
the more dangerous drug or vaccine if that manufacturer provides
adequate warnings of the additional dangers associated with its
chosen process?
The Restatement (Third) answers this question in the
affirmative. Under the Restatement (Third), the manufacturer is
required merely to disclose the risks of one vaccine as opposed to
another, and the health-care professional is required to make the
choice, perhaps on the basis of cost, subject only to a plaintiffs
malpractice remedy.
But, what if (1) the cost difference to the manufacturer is slight;
(2) the competing manufacturers can place only a small amount of
the safer product on the market and demand exceeds supply; or (3)
the manufacturer is the sole supplier of the vaccine, and chooses not
to use the safer process? Would warnings provide an adequate
protection? Would the user or the health-care professional have any
meaningful choice? Such cases might be some of the few that require
courts to look beyond the risk-utility language of section 6(c) of the
Restatement (Third), which employs the "any class of patients"
standard. Instead, courts could look to the "reasonable alternative
design" standard borrowed from section 2(b) of the Restatement
(Third) to balance the "foreseeable risks of harm" and "foreseeable
therapeutic benefits" called for by section 6(c).
See Shackil v. Lederle Lab., 219 N.J. Super. 601, 608, 530 A.2d 1287, 1291 (App.
Div. 1987), rev'd, 116 N.J. 155, 561 A.2d 511 (1989).
8 See id at 609, 530 A.2d at 1291.
7
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This problem does not exist in the usual case. It certainly does
not aid the tort system to turn each tort trial into a mini-FDA
application procedure. Ajury determination based upon trial proofs
should not be substituted for the FDA's extensive drug-approval
process (or the equivalent) for new and untried drugs. If such proofs
are necessary, the alternative proposed by the plaintiff should be
rejected.
Some alternative drugs or processes, however, may not have
received FDA approval, or may have received FDA approval but are
no longer on the market. For example, there may be a drug
approved in another country whose approval process is as strict as our
own. Notwithstanding the Thalidomide debacle in which European
nations approved the drug, but the FDA did not, there may be drugs
with extensive trials and approvals that legitimately could pose as
alternatives in the single-manufacturer or single-process case.
Likewise, FDA-approved drugs or processes that the manufacturer has
not placed on the market, has withdrawn from the market, or has
made available in insufficient quantities, might serve as a basis for
liability against a manufacturer who has instead chosen to market a
more dangerous drug with warnings. In this narrowly defined class of
cases, the Restatement (Third) rule may need modification.
The Restatement (Third) comment g to section 6, which
requires a manufacturer both to test and to employ "risk-avoidance
measures that such testing would reveal," may provide the seed of an
answer.9 Thus, in the unusual and difficult case, the comments to
section 6 may provide arguments for the very protection that the
Restatement (Third) is accused of avoiding.
In most cases, however, section 6 focuses on adequate
instructions and warnings, so that the prescribing health-care
professional has proper information to protect the patient. The
Restatement (Third) does not absolve manufacturers from liability.
Instead, the Restatement (Third) focuses liability on the duty to
disclose risks and benefits to the prescribing professional.
In a different area, the defendants' bar points to subsection
(d) (2) of section 6 as imposing undue liability based on a failure to

9 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
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comment is cross-referenced with comment m to section 2, in which the Reporters
state that "[a] seller is charged with knowledge of what reasonable testing would
reveal. If testing is not undertaken, or is performed in an inadequate manner, and
this failure results in a defect that causes harm, the seller is subject to liability for
harm caused by such defect." Id. § 2 cmt. m.
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warn a patient directly in some instances." As noted earlier, this duty
even might have been extended in the Restatement (Third) to
include liability for products that are extensively advertised to the
public. The first draft of the section so provided, but the position was
abandoned during the drafting process. The Reporters' notes reveal
that only Massachusetts has adopted such a rule." The Massachusetts
logic is interesting and has caused advertising to be considered a
factor in determining whether the learned intermediary rule should
be applied. The American Law Institute, however, "has left to
developing case law whether other exceptions to the learned
intermediary law should be recognized.'02
The present rules,
requiring that the manufacturer generally need warn only the healthcare professional, are founded on the premise that such a prescriber
is in a position to protect the user. If for some reason this is not so,
then the manufacturer is placed in no better position than any other
supplier of a product insofar as warnings through a learned
intermediary are concerned.
Recently, in Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 3 the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed an appellate court decision that found
2A:58C-4 of the New Jersey Statutes prohibited drug manufacturer
liability for failure to provide an adequate warning in direct
consumer advertisements. 14 The Perez decision avoided the express
language of 2A:58C-4, which limits liability for warning defect in drug
and medical device to situations in which there was a failure to warn
prescribing physicians. This departure from the express language
was directed at preventing pharmaceutical manufacturers from

10 See id.
§ 6(d) (2). If "the manufacturer knows or has reason to know the healthcare providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance
with the instructions or warnings" then the manufacturer may be held liable. Id.
1 See, e.g., McDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Mass. 1985). In
Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals,the Tenth Circuit made a similar inroad under Texas
law. See Edwards, 116 F.3d 1341, 1342 (10th Cir. 1997). However, the Fifth Circuit
made a contrary finding in In re Norplant Contraceptive ProductsLiability Litigation, 165
F.3d 374, 379-80 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 161 N.J. 1, 734
A.2d 1245 (1999) (discussed infra).
12 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCrs LIABILITY § 6 cmt. e Reporters'
notes (1997).
Is161 N.J. 1, 734 A.2d 1245 (1999).
14
See id. at 8-9, 33, 745 A.2d at 1249-50, 1264. The court reversed the appellate
decision despite the fact that the committee statements, to which the legislature
specifically directed any questions of interpretation or construction (See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A_58C-la (West 1987), explicitly stated that a warning accompanying
prescription drugs is owed to the physician. See Learned Intermediaries, 157 N.J.L.J.
842, 842 (Aug. 30, 1999).
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misleading the public through mass-media advertising. 5 A more
appropriate approach to this issue, however, might have been to
follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc.1 6 Such an approach would have resulted in a
finding that Wyeth Laboratories was not liable to the consumer
under the New Jersey Products Liability Act for failing to warn in its
advertisements. Wyeth might, however, upon the requisite proof,
have been held liable for fraud, misrepresentation, or conspiracy in
connection with its mass-media advertising campaign. Such a result
would have honored the intent of 2A:58C-4, while providing a
remedy for harm suffered by a consumer due to fraudulent or
misleading advertisements.
Section 6 takes a reasoned approach to the question of liability
for a defective drug or medical device. In a highly regulated industry
in which the FDA acts as gatekeeper, the section breaks with the
traditional tests for liability to focus on the real issue raised by most
cases: adequate warnings. Although there may be some need of an
amendment in the highly unusual cases noted earlier, we generally
can follow where the Restatement (Third) leads.

15

16

See id. at 32, 734 A.2d at 1264.
505 U.S. 504 (1992). The Supreme Court held that federal law preempted

claims based on failure to warn in advertisements and promotions, but did not
preempt claims premised on fraud, misrepresentation, or conspiracy. See id. at 53031.

